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The notion that addiction is a “brain disease” has become widespread and rarely chal-
lenged.The brain-disease model implies erroneously that the brain is necessarily the most
important and useful level of analysis for understanding and treating addiction. This paper
will explain the limits of over-medicalizing – while acknowledging a legitimate place for
medication in the therapeutic repertoire – and why a broader perspective on the problems
of the addicted person is essential to understanding addiction and to providing optimal
care. In short, the brain-disease model obscures the dimension of choice in addiction, the
capacity to respond to incentives, and also the essential fact people use drugs for rea-
sons (as consistent with a self-medication hypothesis). The latter becomes obvious when
patients become abstinent yet still struggle to assume rewarding lives in the realm of work
and relationships.Thankfully, addicts can choose to recover and are not helpless victims of
their own “hijacked brains.”
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INTRODUCTION
In 1970, high-grade heroin and opium flooded Southeast Asia.
Military physicians in Vietnam estimated that nearly half of all
U.S. Army enlisted men serving there had tried opium or heroin
[(1), p. 1046], and between 10 and 25% of them were addicted.
Deaths from overdoses soared. In May 1971, the crisis reached the
front page of the New York Times:“G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic
in Vietnam” (2). Fearful that the newly discharged veterans would
join the ranks of junkies already bedeviling inner cities, President
Richard Nixon commanded the military to begin drug testing. No
one could board a plane home until he had passed a urine test.
Those who failed could attend an army-sponsored detoxification
program (3).
Operation Golden Flow, as the military called it, succeeded.
As word of the new directive spread, most GIs stopped using nar-
cotics. Almost all the soldiers who were detained passed the test on
their second try (4). Once they were home, heroin lost its appeal.
Opiates may have helped them endure a war’s alternating bouts
of boredom and terror, but stateside, civilian life took precedence.
The sordid drug culture, the high price of heroin, and fears of arrest
discouraged use, veterans told Lee Robins, the Washington Uni-
versity sociologist who evaluated the testing program from 1972
to 1974 (5).
Robins’ findings were startling. Only 5% of the men who
became addicted in Vietnam relapsed within 10 months after
return, and just 12% relapsed briefly within 3 years. “This sur-
prising rate of recovery even when re-exposed to narcotic drugs,”
wrote Robins,“ran counter to the conventional wisdom that heroin
is a drug which causes addicts to suffer intolerable craving that
rapidly leads to re-addiction if re-exposed to the drug”(1). Scholars
hailed the results as “revolutionary” and “path-breaking” [(6), p.
215]. The fact that addicts could quit heroin and remain drug-free
overturned the belief that “once an addict, always an addict.”
Unfortunately, that lesson has faded into the past. By the mid-
1990s, the truism “once an addict, always an addict” was back,
repackaged with a new neurocentric twist: “Addiction is a chronic
and relapsing brain disease” (7). It was promoted tirelessly by psy-
chologist Alan I. Leshner, then the director of the National Institute
on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the nation’s premier addiction research
body and part of the National Institutes of Health, and is now
the dominant view of addiction in the field (8). The brain-disease
model is a staple of medical school education and drug coun-
selor training and even appears in the antidrug lectures given to
high-school students (9). Rehab patients learn that they have a
chronic brain disease. And the American Society of Addiction
Medicine, the largest professional group of physicians specializ-
ing in drug problems, calls addiction “a primary, chronic disease
of brain reward, motivation, memory and related circuitry” (10).
Drug czars under Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Barack Obama have all endorsed the brain-disease framework at
one time or another (11). From being featured in a major docu-
mentary on HBO, on talk shows and Law and Order, and on the
covers of Time and Newsweek, the brain-disease model has become
dogma – and like all articles of faith, it is typically believed without
question (12–15).
That may be good public relations, but it is bad public edu-
cation. We also argue that it is fundamentally bad science. The
brain-disease model of addiction is not a trivial rebranding of an
age-old human problem. It plays to the assumption that if biologi-
cal roots can be identified, then a person has a “disease.”And being
afflicted means that the person cannot choose, control his or her
life, or be held accountable. Now introduce brain imaging, which
seems to serve up visual proof that addiction is a brain disease.
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But neurobiology is not destiny: the disruptions in neural mech-
anisms associated with addiction do constrain a person’s capacity
for choice, but they do not destroy it. What’s more, training the
spotlight too intently on the workings of the addicted brain leaves
the addicted person in the shadows, distracting clinicians, policy
makers, and sometimes patients themselves from other powerful
psychological and environmental forces that exert strong influence
on them.
DISEASE, MIND, AND BRAIN
For over three centuries in the United States, physicians, legal
scholars, politicians, and the public have debated the nature of
addiction: is it a defect of the will or of the body? A moral or
a medical problem? (16) Such polarization should by now have
exhausted itself. After all, mountains of evidence attest to the fact
that addiction entails both biological alterations in the brain and
in personal agency. But given what is at stake in these debates –
namely, our deep cultural beliefs about self-control and about
deficits in personal responsibility paired with concerns about what
society owes to addicts and what it can expect of them – we must
be very careful not to ascribe too much influence to the addict’s
brain.
This is an opportune time to pause and clarify two potential
sources of misunderstanding.
First, we do not address the question of whether addiction
is a “disease.” With the potential exception of certain organic
brain syndromes, the field of psychiatry recognizes “disorders” or
syndromes, rather than diseases because the etiologies of mental
illness are not yet well understood. So, addiction fits the notion of
disorder insofar as persistent craving and/or continued, excessive
use leads to dysfunctional behavior. We are more concerned with
the very different issue of whether addiction is best construed as
a brain disease or brain disorder. Addiction is typically associated
with brain changes, to be sure, but in contrast to conventional
brain pathologies, such as Alzheimer’s disease, those alterations
rarely if ever preclude individuals’ capacity to alter their behav-
ior based on foreseeable consequences. The term “brain disease,”
which often implies a lack of control over behavior, obscures that
crucial distinction. Moreover,although severe addictions are partly
rooted in genetic predispositions that are themselves manifested in
brain functioning, these conditions can be profitably understood
at multiple levels of analysis (e.g., psychological, social, cultural)
in addition to the neural level.
Second, our distinguishing between the addict’s brain and his
or her mind does not imply an endorsement of substance dual-
ism. That is, we do not believe that the mind and the brain
are independent of each other or composed of different phys-
ical substances with consciousness existing in a spiritual world
separate from the body. Few scientifically literate persons do. But,
speaking of literacy, there is indeed value in examining the lan-
guage people use when talking about the relationship between
the brain and the mind. To say that the brain and the mind are
“different” does not necessarily mean that the two are materially
separate domains. Every subjective experience, from the ache of
nostalgia to the frisson of a Christmas morning, corresponds to
physical events in the brain. The mind – the realm of feelings,
desires, ideas, memories, intentions, and subjective experience – is
produced by the action of neurons and brain circuits. How else
could it work?
Yet the mind is not identical with the matter that produces it;
one cannot use the physical rules from the cellular level to com-
pletely predict activity at the psychological or behavioral level. Put
somewhat differently, there is a fundamental difference between
substance dualism and property dualism: the latter acknowledges
that everything mental is ultimately produced by physical mat-
ter but allows for the fact that certain mental phenomena have
different properties than neural phenomena (just as molecules
themselves are not alive, but complex configurations of certain
molecules can produce life).
At this time, one cannot rely on the brain alone to predict
or understand everything important about human subjectivity
or behavior. This is because many psychological phenomena are
emergent properties of lower-order constituents such as neural
circuits, neurons, proteins, and genes. “Constitutive” reduction-
ism – reducing complex entities to the sum of their component
parts to facilitate study – is not controversial in the scientific com-
munity; nor do we take issue with it. In his 2006 book,An Argument
for Mind,Harvard University psychologist Jerome Kagan notes that
the appreciation of an impressionistic painting requires far more
than the sum of its parts (17). As the viewer slowly approaches
Claude Monet’s painting of the Seine at Dawn, Kagan notes, there
comes a moment when the scene dissolves into tiny patches of
color. When we adopt the eliminative reductionist position, he
writes, “the coherent psychological component vanishes” [(17),
p. 213]. Some philosophers of mind take a different view. They
speculate that such properties (the painting in full) will ultimately
prove reducible to more basic elements (the paint) (18). They
may prove correct. But for the foreseeable future, valuable infor-
mation is often lost when descending from higher explanatory
levels, such as mental states, to lower levels, such as neuronal
systems.
The distinctions between substance and property dualism and
between constitutive and greedy reductionism may appear arcane,
but overlooking them can lead us to overestimate the explanatory
power of neuroscientific findings. Take addiction, for example.
The dominant view among researchers is that it is a “brain dis-
ease,” plain and simple. Without a doubt, chronic drug exposure
often changes the brain, but knowledge of the neural mechanisms
underlying addiction typically has less relevance to the treatment
of drug addiction and alcoholism than the psychological and social
causes. To be sure, intervening directly on the brain, say with med-
ications such as methadone, can sometimes be of value too. But
understanding the brain of addicts gives us only partial insight
into why they become addicted and how they recover.
ADDICTION AS A “BRAIN DISEASE”
So, what exactly makes addiction a brain disease? “That addiction
is tied to changes in brain structure and function is what makes it,
fundamentally, a brain disease,” Leshner wrote in a now-landmark
article in Science in 1997. But that can’t be right. Every experience
changes the brain – from learning a new language to navigating a
new city. It is certainly true that not all brain changes are equal;
learning French is not the same as acquiring a crack habit. In
addiction, intense activation of certain systems in the brain makes
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it difficult for users to quit. Genetic factors influence the inten-
sity and quality of the subjective effect of the drug, as well as the
potency of craving and the severity of withdrawal symptoms (19).
The process of addiction unfolds partly through the action
of dopamine, one of the brain’s primary neurotransmitters. Nor-
mally, dopamine surges in the so-called reward pathway, or circuit,
in the presence of food, sex, and other stimuli central to survival.
Dopamine enhancement serves as a “learning signal” that prompts
us to repeat eating, mating, and other pleasures. Over time, drugs
come to mimic these natural stimuli. With every puff of a Marl-
boro, injection of heroin, or swig of Jim Beam, the learning signal
in the reward pathway is strengthened, and in vulnerable users,
these substances assume incentive properties reminiscent of food
and sex.
“Salience” is the term that neuroscientists often use to describe
the pull of substances on the addicted – it’s more of a sense of
wanting, even needing, than liking. The development of salience
has been traced to the nerve pathways that mediate the experience
as they emerge from the underside of the brain, in an area called the
ventral tegmentum, and sweep out to regions such as the nucleus
accumbens, hippocampus, and prefrontal cortex, which are associ-
ated with reward, motivation, memory, judgment, inhibition, and
planning.
Other nerve fibers travel from the prefrontal cortex, a region
involved in judgment and inhibition, to parts of the brain that con-
trol behavior. As one psychiatrist put it memorably, “The war on
drugs is a war between the hijacked reward pathways that push the
person to want to use, and the frontal lobes, which try to keep the
beast at bay” (20). Note the word “hijacked.” As shorthand for the
usurpation of brain circuitry during the addiction process, it is a
reasonable metaphor [(21), p. 1715].In the hands of brain-disease
purists, though, “hijacking” has come to denote an all-or-nothing
process, likened to a“switch in the brain”that, once flipped, affords
no retreat for the addict (22). “It may start with the voluntary act
of taking drugs,” Leshner said, “but once you’ve got (addiction),
you can’t just tell the addict, ‘Stop,’ any more than you can tell the
smoker ‘Don’t have emphysema”’ (23).
The reward circuit is also intimately involved in “cue-induced”
craving. Such craving is a special species of desire that manifests
itself in a sudden, intrusive urge to use brought on by “cues” asso-
ciated with use. The mere clink of a whiskey bottle, a whiff of
cigarette smoke, or a glimpse of an old drug buddy on the cor-
ner can set off an unbidden rush of yearning, fueled by dopamine
surges. For the addict who is trying to quit, this is a tense feel-
ing, not pleasurable at all. Because the rush of desire seems to
come out of the blue, users may feel blindsided, helpless, and
confused (24).
In a very impressive display of brain technology, scientists
have used PET and fMRI scans to observe the neural correlates
of craving. In a typical demonstration, addicts watch videos of
people handling a crack pipe or needle, causing their prefrontal
cortices, amygdala, and other structures to bloom with activity
(25) (videos of neutral content, such as landscapes, induce no
such response). Even in users who quit several months previously,
neuronal alterations may persist, leaving them vulnerable to sud-
den, strong urges to use. The familiar “This is your brain on drugs”
is still with us [this slogan was created in 1987 by an American
drug-prevention charity. To illustrate how drugs affect the brain,
an egg (representing the brain) was cracked on a sizzling frying pan
(representing drugs). Result: fried brain]. Nowadays, however, the
brain itself often substitutes for the fried egg.
THE ADDICTION PARADOX
But that egg is not always sizzling. There is a surprising amount
of lucid time in the daily life of addicts. In their classic 1969 study
“Taking Care of Business: The Heroin User’s Life on the Street,”
criminologists Preble and Casey (26) found that addicts spend
only a small fraction of their days getting high. Most of their time
is spent either working or hustling (27–29). The same is true for
many cocaine addicts (30). We tend to think of them, at their
worst, frantically gouging their skin with needles, jamming a new
rock into a pipe every 15 min, or inhaling lines of powder. In the
grip of such hunger, an addict cannot be expected blithely to get
up and walk away.
These tumultuous states – with neuronal function severely dis-
rupted – are the closest drug use comes to being beyond the user’s
restraint. But in the days between binges, cocaine users worry
about a host of everyday matters: should I find a different job?
Enroll my kid in a better school? Kick that freeloading cousin off
the couch for good? Attend a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, enter
treatment, or register at a public clinic? It is during these stretches
of relative calm that many addicts could make the decision to get
help or quit on their own – and many of them do. But the decision
to quit can be long in coming, far too long for those who destroy
their health, families, or careers in the meantime.
The paradox at the heart of addiction is this: How can the
capacity for choice coexist with self-destructiveness? “I’ve never
come across a single person that was addicted that wanted to be
addicted,” says neuroscientist Nora Volkow, who succeeded Lesh-
ner as director of NIDA in 2003 (31). Aristotle noted this paradox
as well. He used the term Akrasia to denote an appetite or strong
desire for pleasure that leads to actions that are harmful to our
conscious wishes for our well-being (32). Hume spoke of “lib-
erty” as being a “power of acting or not acting according to the
determinations of the will” (33).
Indeed, how many of us have ever come across a heavy per-
son who exercised his or her freedom expressly toward the goal
of becoming fat? Many undesirable outcomes in life arrive incre-
mentally. “We can imagine an addict choosing to get high each
day, though not choosing to be an addict,” says psychologist
Gene Heyman. “Yet choosing to get high each day makes one an
addict” (34).
Let’s follow a typical trajectory to see how this dynamic plays
out. In the early phase of addiction, drugs or alcohol become ever
more appealing, while once-rewarding activities, such as relation-
ships, work, or family, decline in value. The attraction of the drug
starts to fade as consequences accrue – spending too much money,
disappointing loved ones, attracting suspicion at work – but the
drug still retains its allure because it blunts psychic pain, sup-
presses withdrawal symptoms, and douses intense craving [(35),
p. 3]. Addicts find themselves torn between the reasons to use and
reasons not to (36).
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Sometimes a spasm of self-reproach or a flash of self-awareness
tips the balance toward quitting. William S. Burroughs, an Amer-
ican novelist and heroin addict, calls this the “naked lunch” expe-
rience, “a frozen moment when everyone sees what is on the end
of every fork” [(37), p. 199]. Lawford (38), himself in recovery
from drugs and alcohol, edited a 2009 collection of essays called
Moments of Clarity in which the actor Alec Baldwin, singer Judy
Collins, and others recount the events that spurred their recover-
ies. Some quit on their own; others got professional help. A theme
in each of their stories is a jolt to self-image: “This is not who I am,
not who I want to be” (39). One recovered alcoholic describes the
process: “You tear yourself apart, examine each individual piece,
toss out the useless, rehabilitate the useful, and put your moral
self back together again” (40). These are not the sentiments of
people in helpless thrall to their diseased brains. Nor are these
sentiments the luxury of memoirists. Patients have described sim-
ilar experiences to us: “My God, I almost robbed someone!”“What
kind of mother am I?” or “I swore I would never switch to the
needle.”
LONG-TERM ADDICTION IS THE EXCEPTION
And it turns out that quitting is the rule, not the exception – a
fact worth acknowledging, given that the official NIDA formula-
tion is that “addiction is a chronic and relapsing [italics added]
brain disease.” The Epidemiological Catchment Area Study, done
in the early 1980s, surveyed 19,000 people. Among those who
had become dependent on drugs by age 24, more than half later
reported not a single drug-related symptom. By age 37, roughly
75% reported no drug symptom. The National Comorbidity
Survey, conducted between 1990 and 1992 and again between
2001 and 2003 and the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alco-
hol and Related Conditions, done between 2001 and 2002 with
more than 43,000 subjects, found that 77 and 86% of peo-
ple who said they had once been addicted to drugs or alco-
hol reported no substance problems during the year before the
survey (41).
By comparison, people who were addicted within the year
before the survey were more likely to have concurrent psychi-
atric disorders. Additionally, NIDA estimates that relapse rates
of treated drug-addicted patients run from 40 to 60% (42). In
other words, they are not representative of the universe of addicts.
They are the hard cases – the chronic and relapsing patients. Yet
these patients often make the biggest impressions on clinicians
and shape their views of addiction, if only because clinicians are
especially likely to encounter them.
Researchers and medical professionals err in generalizing
from the sickest subset of people to the overall population of
patients. This caveat applies across the medical spectrum. Just
as the clinician wrongly assumes that all addicts must be like
the recalcitrant ones who keep stumbling through the clinic
doors, psychiatrists sometimes view people with schizophrenia
as doomed to a life of dysfunction on the basis of their fre-
quent encounters with those whose delusions and hallucinations
don’t improve with treatment. The error of extrapolating liberally
from these subsets of difficult patients is so common that statis-
ticians Patricia and Jacob Cohen gave it a name: the “clinician’s
illusion” (43).
INTENDED BENEFITS OF THE BRAIN-DISEASE MODEL
Advocates of the brain-disease paradigm have good intentions. By
placing addiction on an equal medical footing with more conven-
tional brain disorders, such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, they
want to create an image of addicts as victims of their own way-
ward neurochemistry. They hope that this portrayal will inspire
insurance companies to expand coverage for addiction and politi-
cians to allocate more funding for treatment [(44), p. 33]. And in
the hands of Alan Leshner, the model has had real political utility
(45). Before he was NIDA director, Leshner served as acting direc-
tor of the National Institute of Mental Health. There, he saw how
brain-disease “branding” could prompt Congress to act. “Mental
health advocates started referring to schizophrenia as a ‘brain dis-
ease’ and showing brain scans to members of congress to get them
to increase funding for research. It really worked,” he said (46).
Many experts credit the brain-disease narrative with enhancing
the profile of their field. The late Bob Schuster, head of NIDA from
1986 to 1991, admitted that although he did not think of addiction
as a disease, he was “happy for it to be conceptualized that way for
pragmatic reasons. . . for selling it to Congress”(47). For decades,
addiction research had been a low-status field, disparaged by other
researchers as a soft science that studied drunks and junkies. Now
the field of neuroscience was taking greater notice. “People recog-
nize that certain decision makers and others are very impressed
with molecular biology,” said Robert L. Balster, director of the
Institute for Drug and Alcohol Studies at Virginia Commonwealth
University (48).
Psychiatrist Jerome Jaffe, an eminent figure in the field and the
first White House adviser on drugs (the precursor of the “drug
czar”), sees the adoption of the brain-disease model as a tactical
triumph and a scientific setback. “It was a useful way for particu-
lar agencies to convince Congress to raise the budgets (and) it has
been very successful,” he said. Indeed, neuroimaging, neurobio-
logical research, and medication development consume over half
of the NIDA research budget. In light of the agency’s reach – it
funds almost all substance-abuse research in the United States –
it sets the national agenda regarding which research gets funded
and therefore the nature of the data produced and the kinds of
topics that investigators propose. But Jaffe argues that the brain-
disease paradigm presents “a Faustian bargain – the price that one
pays is that you don’t see all the other factors that interact (in
addiction)” (3).
Many proponents of the brain-disease concept were deeply
committed to dispelling the stigma surrounding addiction. Med-
icalizing the condition was a powerful way, they hoped, to rehabil-
itate addicts’ poor public image from the perception of undis-
ciplined deadbeats to people struggling with an ailment. This
approach had its roots in the world of mental health advocacy.
Until the early 1980s, plenty of people blamed parents for their
children’s serious mental problems. Then advocates began to pub-
licize neuroscientific discoveries, demonstrating, for example, that
schizophrenia is associated with abnormalities of brain structure
and function. In this effort, brain imaging has served sufferers well,
helping legitimize their symptoms by representing visually the ill-
ness in their brains (49–53). The idea, of course, was that these
benefits would extend to addicts. But it turns out that it’s harder
to destigmatize addiction.
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SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NEUROCENTRIC VIEW OF
ADDICTION
For all its benign aspirations, there are numerous problems with
the brain-disease model. On its face, it implies that the brain is the
most important and useful level of analysis for understanding and
treating addiction. Sometimes the model even equates addiction
with a neurological illness, plain, and simple (10). Such neuro-
centrism has clinical consequences, downplaying the underlying
psychological and social reasons that drive drug use.
Recovery is a project of the heart and mind. The person, not
his or her autonomous brain, is the agent of recovery. Notably,
Alcoholics Anonymous, the institution perhaps most responsible
for popularizing the idea that addiction is a disease, employs the
term as a metaphor for loss of control. Its founders in the 1930s
were leery of using the word “disease” because they thought that it
discounted the profound importance of personal growth and the
cultivation of honesty and humility in achieving sobriety (54).
The brain-disease narrative misappropriates language better
used to describe such conditions as multiple sclerosis or schiz-
ophrenia – afflictions of the brain that are neither brought on
by the sufferer nor modifiable by the desire to be well. It offers
false hope that an addict’s condition is completely amenable to
a medical cure (much as pneumonia is to antibiotics). Finally, as
we’ll see, it threatens to obscure the vast role of personal agency in
perpetuating the cycle of use and relapse.
Addicts embarking on recovery often need to find new clean and
sober friends, travel new routes home from work to avoid passing
near their dealer’s street, or deposit their paycheck directly into
a spouse’s account to keep from squandering money on drugs.
A teacher trying to quit cocaine switched from using a chalk-
board – the powdery chalk was too similar to cocaine – and
had a whiteboard installed instead. An investment banker who
loved injecting speedballs – a cocktail of cocaine and heroin in the
same syringe – made himself wear long-sleeved shirts to prevent
glimpses of his bare and inviting arms. Former smokers who want
to quit need to make many fine adjustments, from not lingering
at the table after meals to ridding their homes of the ever-present
smell of smoke, removing car lighters, and so on.
Thomas Schelling, a 2005 Nobel laureate in economics, refers
to these purposeful practices as self-binding (55). The great self-
binder of myth was Odysseus. To keep himself from heeding the
overpowering song of the sea sirens – the half-woman, half-bird
creatures whose beautiful voices lured sailors to their deaths –
Odysseus instructed his men to tie him to the mast of his ship
(56). The famous Romantic English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
an opium addict, is said to have hired men to prevent him from
entering a pharmacy to purchase opium (57). Today, one can hire
a firm that will provide binding services. It imposes surprise urine
tests on the client, collects evidence of attendance at AA meetings
or treatment sessions, and sends a monthly status report (with the
good or bad news) to another person, such as a parent, spouse, or
boss (58).
Some addicts devise their own self-binding strategies. Others
need the help of therapists, who teach them to identify and antic-
ipate cues that trigger craving. Beyond the classic triad of people,
places, and things, they come to realize that internal states, such as
stress, bad moods, and boredom, can prompt drug urges (59).
Managing craving matters mightily in recovery, but it usually
is not enough. Another very important truth is that an addict uses
drugs or alcohol because they serve a purpose. Caroline Knapp, in
her powerful 1996 memoir Drinking: A Love Story, recounted why
she spent two decades of her life as an alcoholic: “You drank to
drown out fear, to dilute anxiety and doubt and self-loathing and
painful memories” (60). Knapp doesn’t describe an urge to drink
so much as a need to drink. She was not manipulated by an alien
desire but by something woven into her being. To say that Knapp’s
problem was merely the effect of heavy drinking on her brain is to
miss the true threat to her well-being: the brilliant but tormented
Knapp herself.
Heroin and speed helped screenwriter Jerry Stahl, author of
Permanent Midnight, attain “the soothing hiss of oblivion.” But
when the drugs wore off, his vulnerabilities throbbed like a fresh
surgical incision. In surveying his life, Stahl wrote, “Everything,
bad or good, boil(ed) back to the decade on the needle, and the
years before that imbibing everything from cocaine to Romilar, pot
to percs, LSD to liquid meth and a pharmacy in between: a lifetime
spent altering the single niggling fact that to be alive means being
conscious” [(61), p. 3–6]. The negative states to which we refer are
typically underlying problems with emotional distress, especially
mood or anxiety. To be sure, repeated use of drugs such as alcohol
and cocaine can exacerbate primary depressive and anxiety disor-
ders in the long term (62), but in the short term, the user almost
always feels relief. Given the common problem of “steep discount-
ing” in addicts, it is not surprising that addicts will attend to the
experiencing self at the expense of the future self.
Or take Lisa, a 37-year-old woman featured in an HBO doc-
umentary on addiction. When we meet her, Lisa is living in a
rundown hotel room in Toronto and working as a prostitute. She
sits on the bed and talks with the filmmaker behind the camera.
Flipping her shiny brown hair and inspecting her well-kept nails,
Lisa is animated as she boasts about how much she makes selling
sex, how much she spends on cocaine, and the longed-for “obliv-
ion” that drugs help her attain. When Lisa was filmed, she was
healthy and engaging; she looked and talked like someone who
had recently been abstinent but was back in the early stages of her
next downward spiral. She had no interest in stopping things at
this point. “Right now, I am in no position to go into recovery (this
way of life) is working for me . . . I have money, drugs, business. I’m
O.K.”To say that Lisa’s problem is the effect of cocaine on her brain
is to miss the true threat to her well-being: Lisa herself. “I always
use for a reason. It’s repressing what needs to be repressed,” she
says (63). To be certain, not all drug use in the service of improving
mood is dysfunctional. But Lisa, who had been in treatment several
times, is representative of individuals whose drug use starts out as
a controlled and effective attempt at self-soothing but eventually
becomes all-consuming and interferes with her life.
These stories highlight one of the shortcomings of the neu-
rocentric view of addiction. This perspective ignores the fact that
many people are drawn to drugs because the substances temporar-
ily quell their pain: persistent self-loathing, anxiety, alienation,
deep-seated intolerance of stress or boredom, and pervasive lone-
liness. The brain-disease model is of little use here because it does
not accommodate the emotional logic that triggers and sustains
addiction (35, 64, 65).
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THE POWER OF INCENTIVES AND ADDICTS AS CHOOSING
BEINGS
In December 1966, Leroy Powell of Austin, TX, USA, was con-
victed of public intoxication and fined $20 in a municipal court.
Powell appealed the conviction to county court, where his lawyer
argued that he suffered from “the disease of chronic alcoholism.”
Powell’s public display of inebriation therefore was“not of his own
volition,” and the fine constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
A psychiatrist concurred, testifying that Powell was “powerless not
to drink” (66).
Then Powell took the stand. On the morning of his trial, he had
a drink at 8 a.m. that his lawyer gave to him, presumably to stave off
morning tremors. Here is an excerpt from the cross-examination:
Q: You took that one [drink] at eight o’clock [a.m.] because
you wanted to drink?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you knew that if you drank it, you could keep on
drinking and get drunk?
A: Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I didn’t take
but that one drink.
Q:You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but this morn-
ing you took one drink and then you knew that you couldn’t
afford to drink anymore and come to court; is that right?
A: Yes, sir, that’s right.
Q: Because you knew what you would do if you kept drinking
that you would finally pass out or be picked up?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you didn’t want that to happen to you today?
A: No, sir.
Q: Not today?
A: No, sir.
Q: So you only had one drink today?
A: Yes, sir (66).
The judge let stand Powell’s conviction for public intoxication.
A second appeal followed, this time to the U.S. Supreme Court. It,
too, affirmed the constitutionality of punishment for public intox-
ication. “We are unable to conclude,” said the court, “that chronic
alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from
such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public
that they are utterly unable to control their performance” (66).
For people like Powell who are not otherwise motivated to
quit, consequences can play a powerful role in modifying behav-
ior. Powell took only a single drink the morning of his trial
because of foreseeable and meaningful consequences. Far from
being unusual, his ability to curtail his drinking accords with a
wealth of studies showing that people addicted to all kinds of
drugs – nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines –
can change in response to rewards or sanctions (67–69). Powell
had surely experienced many alcohol-induced brain changes, but
they did not keep him from making a choice that morning.
If Powell came before a judge today, his lawyer might well
introduce a scan of his brain “craving” alcohol as evidence of his
helplessness. If so, the judge would be wise to reject the scan as
proof. After all, a judge, or anyone, can ponder scans of “addicted”
brains all day, but he or she would never consider someone an
addict unless that person behaves like one (70–73). As legal scholar
Stephen Morse puts it, “actions speak louder than images” (74).
Consider the following fMRI experiment by researchers at Yale
and Columbia. They found that the brains of smokers report-
ing a strong desire to smoke displayed enhanced activation of
reward circuitry, as would be expected (75). But they also showed
that subjects could reduce craving by considering the long-term
consequences of smoking, such as cancer or emphysema, while
observing videos depicting people smoking. When subjects did so,
their brains displayed enhanced activity in areas of the prefrontal
cortex associated with focusing, shifting attention, and control-
ling emotions. Simultaneously, activity in regions associated with
reward, such as the ventral striatum, decreased (76).
Investigators at NIDA observed the same pattern when they
asked cocaine users to inhibit their craving in response to cues.
Subjects underwent PET scanning as they watched a video of
people preparing drug paraphernalia and smoking crack cocaine.
When researchers instructed the addicts to control their responses
to the video, they observed inhibition of brain regions normally
implicated in drug craving. When not deliberately suppressing
their cravings, the addicts reported feeling their typical desire
to use, and the PET scans revealed enhanced activation in brain
regions that mediate craving (77).
These powerful findings illuminate the capacity for self-control
in addicts. They also underscore the idea that addicts persist not
because of an inability to control the desire to use but from a
failure of motivation. Granted, summoning sustained motivation
can be a great challenge: it takes a lot of energy and vigilance to
resist craving, especially urges that ambush the addict unexpect-
edly. Studies on the regulation of craving also help distinguish
behavior that people do not control from behavior that they can-
not control. Imagine, by way of contrast, promising a reward to
people with Alzheimer’s if they can keep their dementia from wors-
ening. That would be both pointless and cruel because the kinds
of brain changes intrinsic to dementia leave the sufferer resistant
to rewards or penalties.
What Powell’s case showed was that even though he sustained
brain changes, those changes did not prevent his behavior from
being shaped by consequences. Contingency management – the
technical term for the practice of adjusting consequences, includ-
ing incentives – often succeeds with people who face serious losses,
such as their livelihood, professional identity, or reputation. When
addicted physicians come under the surveillance of their state med-
ical boards and are subject to random urine testing, unannounced
workplace visits, and frequent employer evaluations, they fare well:
70–90% are employed with their licenses intact 5 years later [(78),
p. 165]. Likewise, scores of clinical trials show that addicts who
know they will receive a reward, such as cash, gift certificates, or
services, are nearly two to three times as likely to submit drug-free
urine samples as addicts not offered rewards (79, 80).
Unfortunately, treatment programs are rarely in a position
to offer cash or costly rewards. But the criminal justice system
has an ample supply of incentives at its disposal and has been
using such leverage for years. One of the most promising demon-
strations of contingency management comes from Honolulu in
the form of Project HOPE, Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with
Enforcement.
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Project HOPE includes frequent random drug testing of offend-
ers on probation. Those who test positive are subject to immediate
and brief incarceration. Sanctions are fair and transparent: all
offenders are treated equally, and everyone knows what will hap-
pen in case of an infraction. The judges express a heartfelt faith
in offenders’ ability to succeed. These basic elements of HOPE’s
contingency administration – swiftness, sureness, transparency,
and fairness combined with expectation for achievement – are a
potent prescription for behavior change in just about anyone.
Indeed, after 1 year of enrollment in Project HOPE, participants
fared considerably better than probationers in a group who served
as a comparison. They were 55% less likely to be arrested for a new
crime and 53% less likely to have had their probation revoked.
These results are even more impressive in light of the participants’
criminal histories and their heavy, chronic exposure to metham-
phetamine, which can impair aspects of cognitive function [on
project HOPE, see (81); on the effects of methamphetamines, see
(82–86)].
These findings join a vast body of experimental data attest-
ing to the power of incentives to override the lure of drugs. Yet
because the facts contradict the idea that addiction is analogous to
Alzheimer’s disease, some HOPE personnel objected to incentives,
arguing that addicts couldn’t be accountable for their behavior.
Likewise, when researchers asked NIDA to consider reviewing
HOPE in its formative years, the agency declined on the grounds
that methamphetamine addicts are not capable of responding to
incentives alone (87–91).
CAN MEDICINE “CURE” ADDICTION?
The brain-disease model leads us down a narrow clinical path.
Because it states that addiction is a “chronic and relapsing” condi-
tion, it diverts attention from promising behavioral therapies that
challenge the inevitability of relapse by holding patients account-
able for their choices. At the same time, because the model implies
that addicts cannot stop using drugs until their brain chem-
istry returns to normal, it overemphasizes the value of brain-level
solutions, such as pharmaceutical intervention. In 1997, Leshner
ranked the search for a medication to treat methamphetamine
addiction as a “top priority (23). A decade later, Volkow predicted,
“We will be treating addiction as a disease (by 2018), and that
means with medicine” (15).
The search for a magic bullet is folly – and even NIDA has given
up hope of finding a wonder drug – but the brain-disease narrative
continues to inspire unrealistic goals. When British pop star Amy
Winehouse succumbed to her high-profile alcoholism in the sum-
mer of 2011, a Psychology Today columnist asked, “Could neuro-
science have helped Amy Winehouse?”(92). The author answered
in the affirmative, suggesting a dopamine-altering medication of
the future because addiction “may be a brain problem that sci-
ence can eventually solve.” Neuroscientist David Eagleman goes
even further, asserting that “addiction can be reasonably viewed as
a neurological problem that allows for medical solutions, just as
pneumonia can be viewed as a lung problem” (93). But the anal-
ogy doesn’t hold up. Changing a behavior like addiction requires
addicts to work hard to change their patterns of thought and
behavior. In contrast, antibiotic cures for pneumonia work even if
the patient is in a coma.
The hope of a medical treatment is the logical outgrowth of
placing the brain at the center of the addictive process. Overall, suc-
cess to date has been genuine but modest. When motivated patients
take medications – especially patients already armed with relapse-
prevention strategies and the support of family and friends – they
can sometimes vault into sustained recovery. Methadone, a long-
acting synthetic opiate taken once a day to prevent opiate with-
drawal, has played a major role in treating addiction to heroin and
painkillers since the 1960s (94). Still, to their counselors’ chagrin,
up to half the patients in methadone clinics also fortify them-
selves with heroin, cocaine, or Valium-like tranquilizers called
benzodiazepines, sold on the street (95). Despite three decades
of effort, there is still no medication therapy for cocaine. Cocaine
immunotherapy (popularly called a cocaine “vaccine”) to prevent
cocaine molecules from entering the brain is now in development,
but previews do not look promising for wide-scale use (96). Other
types of medications include blocking agents, such as naltrexone
for opiate addiction, which occupy neuronal receptors and blunt
a drug’s effect (97). Aversive agents, such as Antabuse (disulfi-
ram), cause people to feel nauseated and vomit when they ingest
alcohol (98). They can be effective in some cases, although many
individuals elect to stop taking them.
These medications are not the product of modern neuro-
science; they were developed decades ago. Even a vaccine was
sought in the 1970s, although today’s techniques are vastly more
sophisticated. More recently, neuroscientists have collaborated
with pharmacologists to develop medications to reverse or com-
pensate for the pathological effects of drugs on the brain. The
premise is that different components of addiction can be targeted
by different medications. These components are the “reward” cir-
cuit (which mediates a strong desire to use and preoccupation
with imminent use) and the craving mechanism associated with
conditioned cues. Thus far, success has been elusive. Anticraving
agents have shown some promise for alcoholics, but treatments
for cocaine addiction have been disappointing (99–102).
Traditionally, pharmacologists have approached the treatment
of alcoholics and addicts in the same way they address most psy-
chiatric diseases: as a matter of reversing or compensating for
neuropathology – in this case, the neural alteration resulting from
repeated use. This is a logical approach, but instead of focusing
almost exclusively on what is wrong in the brain, perhaps they
should also investigate the ways in which addicts recover. Addicts
find non-drug sources of interests and gratification that generate
their own outpourings of dopamine; they practice self-binding
and mindfulness exercises that make the prefrontal cortex bet-
ter at controlling impulses. Relinquishing drugs and alcohol is
accompanied by a shift in the brain’s valuation systems. How, and
even whether, these dynamics will translate into pharmacotherapy
is a complicated question, but perhaps the answer will spur dis-
covery of more effective medications – not panaceas but helpful
aids to hasten the process of recovery. Some proponents of the
brain-disease model would say that emphasizing the role of choice
in addiction is just another way to stigmatize addicts and justify
penal responses over therapeutic ones. To this way of thinking, if
we see the addict as a “chronic illness sufferer,” we will no longer
view him or her as a “bad person” (23, 103). This sentiment echoes
throughout the addiction community. “We can continue playing
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the blame game,” said Volkow in 2008 “Or we can parlay the trans-
formative power of scientific discovery into a brighter future for
addicted individuals” (104).
FALSE CHOICES: SICK OR BAD
Sick brain versus flawed character? Biological determinism versus
bad choices? Why must these be our only options? This black-
and-white framing sets a rhetorical trap that shames us into siding
with the brain-disease camp lest we appear cruel or uncaring.
The bind, of course, is that it is impossible to understand addic-
tion if one glosses over the reality that addicts do possess the
capacity for choice and an understanding of consequences. Forc-
ing a choice between “sick or bad” adds confusion, not clarity,
to the long-standing debate over just how much to hold addicts
responsible in ways that are beneficial to them and to the rest of
society.
Although it makes no sense to incarcerate people for minor
drug crimes, exempting addicts from social norms does not ensure
them a brighter future. Stigmatization is a normal part of social
interaction – a potent force in shaping behavior. Author Susan
Cheever, a former alcoholic, coined a new word, “drunkenfreude,”
to denote how the embarrassing antics of intoxicated friends and
strangers keep her sober.“[Watching] other people get drunk helps
me remember,” Cheever writes. “I learn from seeing what I don’t
want and avoiding it” (105).
Too often, well-meaning family members and friends try to
insulate individuals from the consequences of their behavior
and thereby miss an important opportunity to help the addict
quit. There is nothing unethical – and everything natural and
socially adaptive – about condemning reckless and harmful acts.
At the same time, because addicts are people who suffer, we must
also provide effective care and support progressive approaches,
such as Project HOPE. If we want to garner social and polit-
ical support for addicts’ plight, the best way to do that is to
develop the most effective modes of rehabilitation possible –
not to advance a reductive and one-dimensional version of
addiction.
And what of the efforts to destigmatize addiction through med-
icalization? Results are mixed. In some surveys of the public, well
over half of respondents saw addiction as a “moral weakness” or
“character flaw.” In others, over half to two-thirds classified it as
a “disease.” An Indiana University study asked over 600 people
whether they viewed alcoholism as the result of a genetic prob-
lem or chemical imbalance (i.e., a “neurobiological conception”)
or as an outgrowth of “bad character” or “the way he or she was
raised.” Those endorsing a neurobiological explanation rose from
38% in 1996 to 47% in 2006; the proportion endorsing psychiatric
treatment increased from 61 to 79% (106–112).
Another study revealed an unexpected pattern over the past few
decades. As people accepted a biological explanation for mental ill-
ness and substance-abuse, their desire for social distance from the
mentally ill and addicted increased. Biological explanations also
appear to foster pessimism about the likelihood of recovery and
the effectiveness of treatment (113–121). This finding may seem
counterintuitive. One might think that a biological explanation
would be good news to a patient – and to be sure, some people
with mental illness do indeed find it a relief. But when the patient’s
affliction is addiction and there are no medical cures to restore an
addict’s disrupted brain, emphasizing the biological dimension
seems misguided.
The authors of the chronic-brain-disease narrative were
inspired by discoveries about the effects of drugs on the brain. The
promise of finding powerful antiaddiction medications seemed
great. The maturing science of addiction biology would mean
that once and for all, the condition would be taken seriously as
an illness – a condition that began with the explicit, voluntary
decision to try drugs but transitioned into an involuntary and
uncontrollable state. This knowledge, they hoped, would sensitize
policy makers and the public to the needs of addicts, including
access to public treatment and better private insurance coverage.
A softening of puritanical attitudes and an easing of punitive law
enforcement were also on the agenda.
The mission was worthy, but the outcome has been less salutary.
The neurocentric perspective encourages unwarranted optimism
regarding pharmaceutical cures and oversells the need for profes-
sional help. It labels as “chronic” a condition that typically remits
in early adulthood. The brain-disease story gives short shrift to
the reality that substances serve a purpose in addicts’ lives and
that neurobiological changes induced by alcohol and drugs can be
overridden.
Like many misleading metaphors, the brain-disease model con-
tains some truth. There is a genetic influence on alcoholism and
other addictions, and prolonged substance-abuse often damages
brain structures that mediate self-governance. Yet the problem
with the brain-disease model is its misplaced emphasis on biology
as the star feature of addiction and its relegation of psychological
and behavioral elements to at best supporting roles. “If the brain
is the core of the problem, attending to the brain needs to be a
core part of the solution,” as Leshner once put it (7). The clinical
reality is just the opposite: The most effective interventions aim
not at the brain but at the person. It’s the minds of addicts that
contain the stories of how addiction happens, why people con-
tinue to use drugs, and, if they decide to stop, how they manage to
do so. This deeply personal history can’t be understood exclusively
by inspecting neural circuitry.
BEYOND THE BRAIN
In the end, the most useful definition of addiction is a descrip-
tive one, such as this: Addiction is a behavior marked by repeated
use despite destructive consequences and by difficulty quitting
not withstanding the user’s resolution to do so. This “definition”
isn’t theoretical; it explains nothing about why one “gets” addic-
tion – and how could it offer a satisfying causal account when there
are multiple levels at which the process can be understood? Our
proposed definition merely states an observable fact about the
behavior generally recognized as addiction. That’s a good thing
because a blank explanatory slate (unbiased by biological ori-
entation or any other theoretical model) inspires broad-minded
thinking about research, treatment, and policy. Is there room for
neuroscience in this tableau? Of course. Brain research is yield-
ing valuable information about the neural mechanisms associated
with desire, compulsion, and self-control – discoveries that may
one day be better harnessed for clinical use. But the daily work of
recovery, whether or not it is abetted by medication, is a human
process that is most effectively pursued in the idiom of purposeful
action, meaning, choice, and consequence.
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